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Abstract. We address secure vehicle communication using secrecy capacity. In 
particular, we research the relationship between secrecy capacity and various 
types of parameters that determine secrecy capacity in the vehicular wireless 
network. For example, we examine the relationship between vehicle speed and 
secrecy capacity, the relationship between the response time and secrecy 
capacity of an autonomous vehicle, and the relationship between transmission 
power and secrecy capacity. In particular, the autonomous vehicle has set the 
system modeling on the assumption that the speed of the vehicle is related to 
the safety distance. We propose new vehicle communication to maintain a 
certain level of secrecy capacity according to various parameters. As a result, 
we can expect safer communication security of autonomous vehicles in 5G 
communications. 
Keywords: V2V communication, Physical Layer Security, Secrecy Capacity, 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) can improve road safety and traffic 
efficiency for any smart city [1]. Vehicular wireless network security is of vital 
importance for the deployment of ITSs in practice [2], [3]. Previous works mainly 
focus on the use of co-operative relaying to enhance transmission reliability, the 
improvement of end-to-end throughput, and the extension of the service range of 
vehicular networks. However, the openness of the vehicular channels makes 
transmission data available to illegal users as well as the eavesdroppers.  Therefore, 
guaranteeing the secrecy of the data transmission is also of vital importance. IEEE 
1609.2 specifies the formats for secure messages and the corresponding crypto 
procedure in the vehicular wireless networks. However, management of the secret 
keys often requires a trusted third party authorization as well as complex network 
architectures and protocols that are difficult to satisfy in vehicular wireless networks 
[4]. Ao Lei introduced a Blockchain-based dynamic key management for 
heterogeneous ITSs [5]. Instead of the cryptography based security, physical layer 
security (PLS) has recently been introduced by [6], [7], [8]. 
 
We have more deeply studied V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle) communication using 
physical layer security based on secrecy capacity. This paper is described as follows. 
First, the relationship between the safety distance and the speed of the vehicle is studied. 
Next, a system for calculating secrecy capacity according to the vehicle speed is 
modeled. After that, we have looked at the relationship of secrecy capacity according to 
various parameters. Next, the concept of vehicle communication using secrecy capacity 
is disclosed. Finally, in addition to physical layer security according to secrecy capacity 
in vehicle communication, we have also studied how to increase physical layer security. 
2 SAFETY DISTANCE BASED ON VELOCITY 
In self-driving automation, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) is a very important 
technique. ACC is configured to regulate vehicle speed and distance between at least 
two vehicles, and systems may have to meet conditions of collision avoidance in various 
situations. For example, there are three scenarios: Stop and Go, Emergency braking, and 
Cut-in [9]. All scenarios include the braking distance between a preceding vehicle and a 
following vehicle. Generally, the braking distance refers to a distance that a vehicle will 
run from an initial braking point to a complete stop. The braking distance includes a 
safety distance between a host vehicle and a target vehicle [10]. That is, the safety 
distance is at least as long as the braking distance. 
 
The autonomous vehicle may perform the braking process shown referring to FIG. 1. 
 
 
In FIG.1, amax is the maximum deceleration in the braking process. The braking 
process comprises the response period ta, the braking clearance period tb and the 
breaking force applying period tc. In this time, theoretical braking distance dL is 
calculated as follows [11]: 
𝑑𝐿  = 𝑣0  (𝑡𝑎  + 𝑡𝑏 +
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Figure 1. Braking Process in the host vehicle 
where v0 is the initial velocity of the host vehicle. 
In FIG.2, the braking safety distance is shown to prevent a collision between the host 
vehicle A and the following vehicle B.     
 
 
As shown in FIG. 2, when the host vehicle A detects that two vehicles (A, B) may 
collide, it will automatically operate a safe guard in the intelligent cruise control system. 
Now assume that the host vehicle A is at initial velocity V1, acceleration a1; the target 
vehicle B is at initial velocity V2, acceleration a2; the safety distance is ds. The safety 
distance ds is calculated as follows [12]: 
𝑑𝑠 = 𝑣1 𝜏 +
𝑉1
2
2𝑎1
−
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2
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where τ is a constant parameter of the intelligent cruise control system.  
 
Our main concern is secure V2V communication. Therefore, we assumed that the 
host vehicle A and the target vehicle B based on ACC systems have constant motion 
and the same speed. Because the respective ACC systems of the host vehicle A and the 
target vehicle B control to maintain the spacing distance between the first vehicle A’s 
front bumper and the second vehicle B’s rear bumper, V1 = V2, and a1 = a2. As a result, 
the safety distance based on the host vehicle A’s velocity is represented below: 
ds = v1 τ . 
 
Consequently, we confirmed that the safety distance ds is proportional to the initial 
velocity V1 of the host vehicle A in V2V communication. That is, the speed of the 
autonomous vehicle is proportional to the safety distance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Vehicle Safety Distance for preventing an end collision 
3 SECRECY CAPACITY FOR V2V COMMUNICATION 
In information theory, channel (or Shannon) capacity is known as the maximum amount 
of information that can be transmitted through a wireless channel. In general, channel 
capacity is given as: 
C = W log  (1 + SNR) 
where W is the channel bandwidth and SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio. Secrecy 
capacity means that the channel capacity of a legitimate channel subtracts the channel 
capacity of a wiretap channel. That is, secrecy capacity is the maximum data rate 
achievable between the legitimate TX-RX pair, subject to the constraints on information 
attainable by the unauthorized receiver [13]. In the Gaussian wiretap channel, secrecy 
capacity Cs is given by  
𝐶𝑠 =
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 +
𝑃
𝑁𝑚
) −
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 +
𝑃
𝑁𝑤
) 
where P is a transmitter’s power, Nm is a receiver’s noise, Nw is an eavesdropper’s noise. 
 
3.1 SYSTEM MODEL BASED ON VELOCITY 
We expect that the distance between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B is 
longer than the safety distance Ds in the autonomous vehicle system. We assumed that 
the eavesdropper E is far away relative to the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B. 
That is, the distance r between the host vehicle A and the eavesdropper E is similar to 
the distance r’ between the target vehicle B and the eavesdropper E. The distance D 
between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B is rθ, where θ is an angle that is 
formed by a first line AE and a second line AE, as shown in FIG. 3. 
 
Figure 3. System Model under faraway eavesdropper 
We consider a V2V communication scenario with the eavesdropper E. Secrecy 
capacity Cs in the fading scenario is given by [14], [15], [16], [17] 
𝐶𝑠 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝑃 |ℎ𝐴𝐵|
2
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) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝑃|ℎ𝐴𝐸|
2
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) 
where P is the transmission power of the host vehicle A, hAB is a fading channel 
coefficient between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B, hAE is a fading channel 
coefficient between the host vehicle A and the eavesdropper E, and N0 is the variance of 
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).  
 
Generally, there are three fading models: Rayleigh, Rician, and Nakagami.  The 
transmitted signal power may reduce according to the distance as d
-α  , where α is a path 
loss exponent [18]. When the path loss distance is the distance D (which is equal to rθ) 
between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B, the fading channel coefficient hAB 
is given by 
ℎ𝐴𝐵 = |
1
(𝑟𝜃)𝛼
| 
. 
 
Also, when path loss distance is the distance r between the host vehicle A and the 
eavesdropper E, the fading channel cofficient hAE is given by 
ℎ𝐴𝐸 = |
1
𝑟𝛼
| 
. 
Accordingly, in this system model secrecy capacity Cs is given by: 
𝐶𝑠 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝑃 
𝑁0(𝑟𝜃)2𝛼
) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝑃
𝑁0𝑟2𝛼
) 
. 
We found that the velocity of the host vehicle is associated to the safety distance ds 
between the legitimated terminals as: 𝑑𝑠 = 𝑣1 𝜏. From a velocity point of view, the 
distance D between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B is given by: 
D = r θ =  v  𝜏 
where v is the current velocity of host vehicle A and τ is a constant parameter of the 
ACC system.  
 
As a result, in this system model, secrecy capacity Cs is given by: 
𝐶𝑠 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝑃 
𝑁0(𝑣 𝜏)2𝛼
) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝑃
𝑁0𝑟2𝛼
) 
. 
For the simplicity of analysis, we assumed that the distance r is fixed. Then secrecy 
capacity Cs is a function expressed by only two variable parameters v and α. FIG. 4 
shows secrecy capacity Cs according to vehicle velocity v. 
 
 
As shown in FIG. 4, we found that secrecy capacity Cs is greatly affected by the path 
loss coefficient α and the vehicle velocity v. First, when the vehicle velocity v increases, 
the secrecy capacity Cs decreases regardless of the path loss coefficient α.  Second, the 
greater the path loss coefficient α, the greater the secrecy capacity Cs. 
 
We also expect that an increase of velocity in the host vehicle A leads to a decrease of 
secrecy capacity Cs. For convenience of explanation, we assume that autonomous 
vehicles are traveling on highways. In simulation, FIG. 5 shows the secrecy capacity Cs 
according to different velocities: 80 Km/h, 100 Km/h, and 120 Km/h. In this simulation, 
we assumed that the distance r between A and E is 1000m, and the fading channel 
model is the Rayleigh fading channel model. As shown in FIG. 4, the secrecy capacity 
is highest at 80 Km/h and lowest at 120 Km/h. We confirmed that a high speed of the 
vehicle may reduce the secrecy capacity. On considering security environments, we aim 
to optimize the transmission power P or the transmission rate according to the vehicle 
speed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Secrecy Capacity Variances according to vehicle 
speed having various path loss coefficients (α=4, α=2, and 
α=1.4) with r=1000 m, P/N0=70dB, and τ= 200ms 
  
 
As shown in FIG. 6, we can find a change in secrecy capacity with transmission 
power ratio P/N0. It can be seen that the secrecy capacity is proportional to the 
magnitude of the transmission power ratio P/N0. That is, the greater transmission power 
ratio P/ N0, the greater secrecy capacity Cs, referring to FIG. 6. 
 
 
Figure 5. Secrecy Capacity Variances at Vehicle speed (80 
Km/h, 100 Km/h, and 120 Km/h) with Path loss coefficient: 
α=3.5, r=1000m, and θ ≒ 0.1 
Figure 6. Secrecy Capacity Variances according to Vehicle 
speed at Transmission Power (P/N0=40dB, P/N0=50dB, and 
P/N0=60dB) with α=1.4, r=1000 m, and τ= 400ms 
In addition, we examined the secrecy capacity of the system according to the reaction 
speed of the ACC system. As shown in FIG. 7, it is confirmed that the faster the 
response speed of the system, the greater the secrecy capacity. 
 
 
Accordingly, we have found that it is important to select appropriate vehicle 
velocities and transmission power ratios P/N0 to keep a constant secrecy capacity. This 
means that we can define the secrecy capacity as a criterion to maintain a certain level 
of security in vehicular communications. 
 
As described above, secrecy capacity can be determined by the vehicle speed, the 
magnitude of the transmission power, and the system parameters. In summary, the 
schematic orientation of secrecy capacity can be determined by the following table. 
 
Table 1 shows the relationship between various parameters and secrecy capacity. 
Vehicle Speed Up Down Secrecy Capacity 
Down Up 
Transmission Power Up Up 
Down Down 
System Parameter 
(Response Time) 
Up Down 
Down Up 
Figure 7. Secrecy Capacity Variances according to Vehicle 
speed at a response speed (τ= 100ms, τ= 200ms, τ= 400ms) 
with α=1.4, and r=1000 m 
3.2 SYSTEM MODEL BASED ON RELAY 
As described above, secrecy capacity decreases as the vehicle speed increases, but it can 
be compensated by cooperative relay communication. In V2V communication, secrecy 
capacity can be improved by introducing one relay R between the host vehicle A and 
the target vehicle B. In general, secrecy capacity of cooperative relay communication is 
higher than that of direct communication without a relay [19]. For simplicity of the 
analysis of secrecy capacity, we assume that the system model comprises one relay R 
between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B, as shown in FIG. 8. 
Channel capacity of the legitimated channel is expressed as:  
𝐶1(𝐴, 𝐵) = 𝑊 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 + (
𝑃𝐴ℎ𝐴𝐵
𝑃𝑅  ℎ𝑅𝐵 + 𝜎𝐵
2)) 
where PA and PR are the transmission powers of the host vehicle A and the relay R, 
respectively, hAB is the channel gain between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B, 
hRB is the channel gain between the relay R and the target vehicle B, 𝜎𝐵
2 is an additive 
white Gaussian noise at the target vehicle B, and W is a bandwidth. 
 
 
 
Now, the channel capacity of the wiretap channel is given by: 
𝐶2(𝐴, 𝐸) = 𝑊 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 + (
𝑃𝐴ℎ𝐴𝐸
𝑃𝑅  ℎ𝑅𝐸 + 𝜎𝐸
2)) 
where hAE is the channel gain between vehicle A and eavesdropper E, and 𝜎𝐸
2 is the 
additive white Gaussian noise at vehicle B. Then, secrecy capacity with cooperative 
relay communication is denoted by 
𝐶𝑅 = 𝑊 [𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 + (
𝑃𝐴ℎ𝐴𝐵
𝑃𝑅  ℎ𝑅𝐵 + 𝜎𝐵
2)) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 + (
𝑃𝐴ℎ𝐴𝐸
𝑃𝑅  ℎ𝑅𝐸 + 𝜎𝐸
2))] 
. 
A B 
R 
E 
Figure 8. System Model with a Relay between A and B 
   
 
FIG. 9 shows secrecy capacity with and without the relay R. Referring to FIG. 9, we 
know that the relay R helps to improve secrecy capacity overall. We confirmed that 
V2V communication using the relay may enhance secrecy capacity. The relationship 
between the existence of the relay and secrecy capacity can be summarized as the 
following table. 
 
Table 2 shows the relationship between the relay mode and secrecy capacity. 
Relay Off Down Secrecy Capacity 
On Up 
 
  
Figure 9. Secrecy Capacity Variance according to Relay 
Existence 
3.3 ERGODIC SECRECY CAPACITY 
Secrecy capacity does not consider the channel variation over time. So, we introduce the 
concept of ergodic secrecy capacity. Ergodic secrecy capacity is defined as the time 
average of the secrecy rate over the legitimated user and the eavesdropper [20], [21], 
[22]. For an ergodic fading channel in MIMO systems, the fading channel coefficients 
are independent and identically distributed. Thus, in the vehicular network, each of the 
host vehicle A, the target vehicle B, and the eavesdropper E may experience a different 
fading state for respective channel use. Assuming that all terminals have perfect CSI 
(channel state information) about the current fading state (CSI), ergodic secrecy 
capacity is denoted by: 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐸𝐴[𝛾]≤𝑃
𝑬𝐴  𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
 𝛾|ℎ𝐴𝐵|
2
𝜎𝐵
2 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1 +
𝛾|ℎ𝐴𝐸|
2
𝜎𝐸
2 ) 
with γ the power allocation, and 
𝐴 = {ℎ𝐴𝐵 ,   ℎ𝐴𝐸 : 
 |ℎ𝐴𝐵|
2
𝜎𝐵
2 >  
 |ℎ𝐴𝐸|
2
𝜎𝐸
2 } 
[23].  
 
.  
 
We compare AWGN (additive white Gaussian noise) channel capacity with the 
fading ergodic channel capacity. As shown to FIG. 10, the AWGN channel capacity is 
higher than the ergodic capacity. 
Figure 10. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity vs. AWGN Capacity, Noise 
power is assumed to be unity. 
4 PROPOSED V2V COMMUNICATION USING SECRECY 
CAPACITY 
Recent studies show an increased interest in calculating the vehicular communication 
capacity in 5G mobile networks [24], [25], [26], [27]. As described above, we confirm 
the relationship between vehicle speed and secrecy capacity, as well as the relationship 
between relay existence and secrecy capacity. We propose new V2V communication 
that performs with cooperative relay communication according to a value of secrecy 
capacity, referring to FIG. 11.  
 
 
Our proposed V2V communication process is as follows:  
1. A host vehicle receives CSI (channel state information) from a target vehicle. 
2. The host vehicle calculates secrecy capacity for connecting the target vehicle. Here, 
secrecy capacity is calculated by a predetermined scheme. 
3. The host vehicle determines whether secrecy capacity exceeds the predetermined 
value. Here, the predetermined value may be changed according to the speed range of 
the vehicle. 
4. If secrecy capacity exceeds the predetermined value, the host vehicle may initiate 
direct communication with the target vehicle. 
5-1. In one case, if the secrecy capacity does not exceed the predetermined value, the 
host vehicle may initiate indirect communication with the target vehicle through 
cooperative relay communication. Then, a relay selection of the vehicular network is 
performed by an optimization algorithm that considers power consumption, secrecy 
enhancement, etc. For example, the optimization algorithm can control the transmission 
power of the host vehicle to increase security in V2V communication. The above V2V 
communication induces the enhancement of physical layer security due to cooperative 
relay communication based on secrecy capacity. 
Figure 11. Proposed Vehicle Communications 
5-2. In another case, if the secrecy capacity does not exceed the predetermined value, 
the host vehicle may increase the transmission power of the host vehicle by the 
predetermined amount. Consequently, vehicle communication will be initiated. 
 
Meanwhile, the host vehicle can select V2I (Vehicular to Infrastructure) 
communication, such as 5G mobile networks, according to the result of the secrecy 
capacity. 
 
In addition, we will define new CSI (channel state information) for 5G vehicle 
communication. The main content that we propose is included in the SNR value in the 
channel state information. Trying to perform initial communication, it is not difficult to 
calculate the SNR value at the receiver if the receiver and receiver know the power to 
transmit because they know the received power. All receivers will be able to calculate 
SNR values and include them in the channel state information. For this proposal, we 
first need to have enough discussion in the relevant standards associations. 
  
5 PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY ENHANCEMENT 
In short, V2V communication satisfies physical layer security based on the secrecy 
capacity. Additionally, we can enforce the security using a physical layer encryption 
based on compressive sensing. Compressive sensing encryption can be an attractive 
solution as it can provide reasonably secure transmissions with simple low-complexity 
ciphers in the physical layer [28-37]. Generally, compressive sensing schemes can 
sample signals below the Nyquist rate [38].  
 
According to V2V communication between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle 
B, a compressive sensing encryption can be optional, referring to FIG. 12. The host 
vehicle A can determine whether or not using the compressive sensing encryption is 
desirable based on the value of secrecy capacity. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Advanced Physical Layer Security based on Compressive Sensing Encryption  
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6 CONCLUSION 
We studied the relationship between secrecy capacity and the speed of a vehicle in the 
vehicular network. As a result, we confirmed that a high speed of the vehicle may 
reduce secrecy capacity. On considering security environments, we need to optimize a 
transmission power or a transmission rate according to the vehicle speed. We also 
confirmed that V2V communication using the relay may enhance secrecy capacity. 
Accordingly, the vehicle user needs to perform V2V communication through the 
optimized selection relay algorithm, which selects the relay to increase secrecy capacity 
based on the vehicle’s velocity. In addition, we introduced a physical layer security 
using compressive sensing encryption. In the future, we may lead to improvements, 
such as more efficient design and faster, more secure communication in the vehicular 
network through physical layer security. 
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